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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MIGUEL ANGEL FLORES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970215-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for murder, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 
1995), and aggravated arson, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (1995), in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to convict defendant of 
aggravated arson? The reviewing court "will reverse a jury 
verdict for insufficient evidence "only when the evidence . . . 
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime. fff State v. Germonto. 868 P.2d 
50, 55 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 124 
(Utah 1989); State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
2. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion for 
a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct? "On appeal from a 
denial of a motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial 
misconduct, because the trial court is in the best position to 
determine an alleged error's impact on the proceedings, we will 
not reverse the trial court's ruling absent an abuse of 
discretion.'' State v. Hav, 859 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1993). 
3. Should this Court consider a challenge to a guilty plea 
taken in strict compliance with the requirements of rule 11, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, raised for the first time on appeal? 
Because defendant raises this issue for the first time on appeal, 
it is a matter for this Court's discretion. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following determinative statutes and rules are set out 
in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103(1) (b) (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7(1) (1995); 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Miguel Angel Flores, was charged with aggravated 
arson (Arson PI. 7-11) and murder (Murder PI. 3-8). * Following a 
1
 The aggravated arson and murder charges were filed as 
separate cases, to wit: case no. 961900814 and case no. 
961900905, respectively (Arson PI. 3, 20; Murder PI. 3, 30) and 
consolidated for appeal (See Murder PI. Clerk Index, p. 1). 
Although the cases were consolidated, the pleadings files have 
been independently paginated, and only the first page of each 
transcript of the various proceedings in each case has been 
Eaginated. Therefore, each citation to the record will identify y name the specific case or by number the first page of the 
specific proceeding, plus page number, e.g., Aggravated Arson 
Pleadings File as ''Arson PI. 3" or Change of Plea Hearing as "R. 
2 
jury trial, defendant was convicted of aggravated arson (Arson 
PI. 90). Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to murder (Murder 
PI. 57-58). The trial court sentenced defendant on both 
convictions to statutory five-to-life terms in the Utah State 
Prison, to be served consecutively (Arson PI. 96; Murder PI. 76). 
The murder sentence was enhanced with a one-year term for the use 
of a firearm and a four-year term for the commission of the 
offense in concert with two or more persons, all enhancements to 
be served consecutively (Murder PI. 77, 78, R. 136 [15]). 
Defendant appealed his convictions to the Utah Supreme Court, 
which poured-over the two cases to this Court (Arson PI. 99, 120, 
123; Murder PI. 85). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Aggravated Arson 
On February 18, 1996, Mary Archuleta resided at 1259 West 
500 South in Salt Lake City, with her nine-year old grandson, 
Joseph Guerrero, her cousin, Candido Herrera, a friend, Jacquie 
Anderson, and Ms. Anderson's boyfriend (R. 131 [70, 92]). None 
of them had any gang affiliation (R. 131 [70-71, 103]). Mary and 
Joseph were sleeping in her bedroom, upstairs (R. 131 [72, 94]). 
Mary was awakened by the sounds of smoke detectors, fire alarms, 
and breaking glass (R. 131 [73, 88-89, 94-95]). Mary saw her 
101 [6]." 
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china cabinet on fire and heard windows cracking from the fire 
(R. 131 [75]). Joseph ran to his aunt's house next door and 
called 911 (R. 131 [95]). Jacquie's boyfriend extinguished the 
fire with a pan of water (R. 131 [76]). Nonetheless, the fire 
melted the Venetian blinds and burned the walls and ceiling in 
the vicinity of the china hutch (R. 131 [81-84]). The window in 
Candido's bedroom was broken (R. 131 [84]). 
Just after the fire was extinguished, the police and fire 
departments arrived at the scene. At that time Mary discovered 
broken bottles and smelled gasoline, and in her bathroom was a 
bottle labeled "Ice 800," containing gasoline, depicted in 
State's exhibit 22 (R. 131 [85-88]. Candido was covered with 
gasoline from his chest down (R. 131 [86]). His bed was also 
covered with gasoline, and among the broken bottles covering the 
floor there was an intact quart-sized beer bottle filled with 
gasoline, pictured in State's exhibits 17 and 18 (R. 131 [87, 
105, 107-09, 111]). After calling 911, Joseph returned to his 
grandmother's house and saw rags all over the ground in both the 
front and back of the house, and broken bottles and a bottle of 
gasoline in his own room, and burned rags in front of the house 
and beneath the bathroom and bedroom windows (R. 131 [96-97]). 
Neither Mary nor Joseph nor Candido saw those who besieged their 
home (R. 131 [90, 100, 114]). 
Officer Jeff Payne of the Salt Lake City Police Department 
4 
was the first official on the scene (R. 132 [255]). He observed 
broken windows in the front and rear of the house, charred pieces 
of cloth around the house, a broken "Ice" beer bottle in the 
bathroom and an unbroken quart-sized Miller beer bottle in the 
bedroom (R. 132 [256-62]). 
Jeffrey Long, an experienced fire investigator with Salt 
Lake City Fire Department investigating the scene, found broken 
glass from a beer bottle and remnants of a burnt wick behind Mary 
Archuleta's china closet, where most of the burning occurred (R. 
132 [274-75]). Inside the house he smelled gasoline in the 
bathroom, bedroom and on Mr. Herrera's body (R. 132 [280-83]). 
The broken "Ice" bottle (State's Ex. 26) and the Miller bottle 
(State's Ex. 27) were tested and found negative for fingerprints 
and positive for gasoline (R. 132 [287-89). Based on his 
investigation, Long concluded that the fire at the Archuleta 
residence was intentionally set to burn the entire house down by 
the use of four incendiary devices constructed of gasoline-filled 
bottles with wicks (R. 132 [290]). He also concluded that if all 
four incendiary devices had gone off, "the structure would have 
probably been fully involved and compromised to the point where 
it would have collapsed probably before the fire department got 
there." He further concluded that Mr. Herrera would have had 
little chance of surviving, considering the placement of the 
devices and his dousing with gasoline (R. 132 [291-92]). 
5 
Testimony of Melissa Chacon 
On the night of February 15, 1996, Davin Trujillo, a member 
of the King Mafia Disciples gang, was shot in the head, by a 
member of the rival Avenues gang (R. 131 [120-21]). According to 
Melissa Chacon, who "hung out" with the King Mafia Disciples gang 
from 1992 until 1996 and had the street name of "Queen Mafia 
Disciple," defendant, Cameron Lopes, and Collin Carter were 
members of the King Mafia Disciples gang (R. 131 [116-19]). Two 
nights later, on February 17, these three gang members met at 
Wanda Fox's apartment to make plans to retaliate for Trujillo's 
shooting (R. 131 [123-26]). Others were also present, including 
Chacone, Wanda Fox, David Samora and Gus Dutson; however, only 
Flores, Dutson, Lopes, Carter and Samora were involved in the 
discussion to retaliate against Adam Archuleta, whom they 
suspected of the shooting (R. 131 [125-31]). Dutson suggested 
that they fire bomb Archuleta's house (R. 131 [127]). 
Dutson told Samora to go outside and get some bottles. In 
response, Samora went out and returned with Miller, quart size 
beer bottles (R. 131 [132]). It was now about 1:00 a.m., 
February 18 (R. 131 [132]). At Dutson's request, Fox and Samora 
went out and returned about one-half hour later with a container 
of gasoline (R. 131 [133]). In the interim, the gang members 
watched television, drank, and ate (R. 131 [133]). When Fox and 
Samora returned with the gas, defendant, Lopes, Carter, Dutson, 
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and Samora retreated to a bedroom for about an hour, though 
Samora was soon ejected (R. 131 [134]). Upon exiting, the four 
went into the bathroom with the four quart bottles and the 
container of gasoline (R. 131 [135]). Dutson then retrieved an 
old T-shirt from Fox's bedroom, tore it up, and returned to the 
bathroom (R. 131 [135-36]). Meanwhile, Chacon and Fox watched 
the television (R. 131 [135-36]). Soon afterward, the four men 
exited from the bathroom with half-filled bottles of gasoline 
with rags in them. Chacon testified that one of the bottles was 
accurately depicted in State's exhibit 18 (R. 131 [136-37]). All 
four also tried on gloves and masks which she and Dutson had 
purchased, and then took them off (R. 131 [137-38]). Then, at 
about 3:00 a.m., the four men left the apartment, each carrying 
one of the gasoline-rag soaked bottles (R. 131 [138-39]). 
About one-half hour later, they all returned. Dutson said 
that his bottle had gone in the front window and "went off" (R. 
131 [139]). Defendant said he was on the side of the house, but 
was not sure whether or not his bottle went off (R. 131 [140]). 
On cross examination, Chacon denied participating in the 
fire bombing plan, though she realized the gang members' 
intentions when Samora returned with the beer bottles and, later, 
the gasoline (R. 131 [151]). Chacon thought there were three 
Miller bottles and one little regular beer bottle, the brand of 
which she did not recall, although she later recalled on redirect 
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examination that State's exhibit 22 showed the smaller gasoline-
filled beer bottle (R. 131 [153, 162-63]). She admitted that 
unless she cooperated with the State she would lose custody of 
her daughter (R. 131 [154-55]). However, she repeatedly 
testified, on redirect and recross examination, that she would 
not tell a lie to protect herself from prison or to protect her 
daughter who was in safe hands (R. 131 [159, 163]). She also 
acknowledged that she had been charged with aggravated arson and 
murder and that in exchange for her truthful testimony at trial 
she had agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit murder and 
to pay restitution and waive her right to bail and a speedy trial 
in both the arson and murder cases, with the expectation that the 
State would amend the conspiracy charge to be a second degree 
felony, dismiss the aggravated arson charge, and recommend 
probation instead of prison commitment (R. 131 [156-59]). 
On redirect, Chacon also testified that her agreement in the 
plea bargain was to testify truthfully, even if it showed her in 
a bad light, and that she was aware that she might go to prison 
for lying (R. 131 [160-61]). Chacon acknowledged that on 
February 18, she considered defendant a friend (R. 131 [161]). 
Testimony of David Samora 
David Samora first met defendant at Wanda Fox's apartment 
right after the Trujillo shooting, which angered defendant (R. 
131 [166, 178]). He admitted that his memory of the evening 
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before the fire-bombing was fuzzy, but that he did not recall 
seeing defendant at Fox's apartment the night before the bombing 
(R. 131 [168-69, 174, 176]). On that occasion he was asked to 
get some gasoline, although he did not recall being asked to get 
any bottles (R. 131 [169]). He and Fox got the gasoline at a 7-
Eleven store (R. 131 [175]). Upon returning to Fox's apartment, 
he went into a bedroom where he recalls Carter, Lopes, Chacon, 
and Dutson talking about a cocktail bomb; however, upon the 
occupants' request, he soon left and went to sleep in another 
room (R. 131 [175-77]). On cross examination, he acknowledged 
that he was testifying with immunity (R. 131 [179]). 
Testimony of Wanda, Fox 
Wanda Fox was acquainted with the King Mafia Disciples gang, 
and knew defendant, Carter and Lopes to be members (R. 131 
[181]). Early on the morning of February 18, 1996, defendant, 
Lopes, Dutson, Carter, Chacon, and Samora were in her apartment 
(R. 131 [182-83]). With her $3 or $4 from Chacon, Fox and Samora 
went to get gasoline from a 7-Eleven store, although she did not 
know its purpose (R. 131 [184, 186]). Samora handed the gas to 
one of those present, and they went into the bathroom with it and 
shut the door (R. 131 [187]). She went into the living room and 
watched television, and Samora went into her bedroom and slept 
(R. 131 [187]). Somewhat later, she saw defendant, Carter, Lopes 
and Dutson emerge from the bathroom, wearing masks and gloves, 
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each holding 32-ounce bottles of gasoline with rags sticking out 
of them. She knew it was gasoline from the smell (R. 131 [188-
89]). The four men left the apartment, reappearing, defendant 
among them, at about 4:00 a.m. (R. 131 [189-91]). When Chacon 
asked "if they did it," Lopes responded, "Yes, we did" (R. 131 
[190]). Fox testified that she had never discussed the incident 
with any of those in her apartment that night (R. 131 [191-92]). 
On cross-examination, Fox testified that on the night of 
February 17, people were partying and drinking (R. 131 [193-95]). 
Defendant appeared between 11:00 p.m. and midnight (R. 131 
[195]). At some point in the evening she heard people, including 
Dutson and Chacon, talking and expressing their anger about the 
Trujillo shooting (R. 131 [195]). Fox denied knowing the purpose 
of the gasoline until she saw the four men come out of the 
bathroom wearing masks and gloves and carrying the gasoline-
filled bottles (R. 131 [196-97]). Fox acknowledged that she was 
not charged with aggravated arson (R. 131 [199]). 
On redirect, Fox testified that she had voluntarily gone to 
the police with her story, that she had not been offered anything 
for her testimony, and that she was testifying truthfully (R. 131 
[199-201]). She again testified that on the night of the 
incident defendant left her apartment with a gasoline-filled 
bottle containing a wick, which he and the others had made, and 
that he returned with the others after having been gone for an 
10 
hour (R. 131 [101-02]). 
On recross examination, Fox emphatically denied that she 
told her story to police to assert her innocence and avoid 
prosecution (R. 131 [202-03]). 
Testimony of Gustave Dutson 
Gustave Dutson had been a member of the 700 Block Bloods, a 
gang that later joined with the King Mafia Disciples (R. 132 
[210-11]). He identified defendant, Lopes, and Carter as a 
members of the King Mafia Disciples gang (R. 132 [212-13]). He 
also identified Davin Trujillo as a member of the King Mafia 
Disciples gang and stated that Trujillo's shooting angered both 
defendant and him (R. 132 [214, 218]). 
Within two or three days after the incident, Dutson, Chacon, 
Smith, Carter, Lopes, and defendant decided to retaliate by fire 
bombing a house on 5th South belonging to the Avenues gang (R. 
132 [218-20]). In aid of their plan, Dutson and Chacon bought 
masks and gloves at various local stores a day or two before the 
incident (R. 132 [220]). 
On the night of February 17, 1996, Dutson and his cohorts 
were partying and getting drunk at Fox's apartment (R. 132 
[221]). At about 1:00 a.m. or 2:00 a.m., while in the bedroom, 
they decided to put their plan into action (R. 132 [221-22, 226-
27]). Dutson was certain that defendant was present (R. 132 
[222]). Their plan was to drive to the alley behind the house, 
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spread out with each conspirator targeting a different window, 
and simultaneously throw their fire bombs (R. 132 [226-27]). 
Each of the four conspirators would have a lighter and one 
gasoline-filled bottle (R. 132 [227]). Neither Fox nor Samora 
participated in the planning (R. 132 [224, 228]). 
Fox and Samora went to get the gasoline (R. 132 [222]). The 
conspirators' planned to put the gasoline into empty quart-sized 
and 40-ounce beer bottles lying around the house (R. 132 [223]). 
When Fox and Samora returned with the gasoline, he, defendant, 
Lopes, and Carter started filling the bottles in the bathroom (R. 
132 [223-24]). These "Molotov cocktails'' were constructed by 
filling the bottles almost to the top and then tightly stuffing 
into the openings rags made of "towels or something" (R. 132 
[225]). Dutson's bomb was made of a gasoline-filled 40-ounce 
"St. Ives" or "Ice 800" beer bottle (R. 132 [228]). Each 
conspirator, including defendant, made his own incendiary device, 
carried his own lighter, and each carried his own incendiary 
device directly to Fox's mother's car (R. 132 [228-29]). 
Defendant drove while the others laid down, out of sight (R. 
132 [230]). They took the gloves to hide their fingerprints and 
the masks to hide their faces, but they were not wearing the 
gloves or masks when they left the apartment, having hidden them 
in their clothes (R. 132 [230-31]). Dutson confirmed that the 
house they drove to and firebombed was the Archuleta home (R. 132 
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[232]) .2 
Upon arriving, they all ran down the alley to a garage shed 
on which Dutson wrote gang symbols (R. 132 [226, 233]). Dutson 
then went around to the front porch, lit the rag in his bottle, 
and threw it through a closed window (R. 132 [233-35]). At the 
same time the other conspirators spread out to the back windows 
(R. 132 [234]). Dutson's bottle broke the window and started a 
fire (R. 132 [235]). He also heard what he assumed to be the 
sound of breaking windows from the back of the house (R. 132 
[235]). Then they all ran back to the car, got in, and drove 
back to Fox's house (R. 132 [236-37]). While in the car, each of 
the conspirator's, including defendant, asserted that each of 
their fire bombs had gone into the house and started a fire, and 
they bragged, "Yeah, we got them punks" (R. 132 [237]). 
After the incident, but before he was arrested, Dutson told 
Chacon what had happened (R. 132 [240-41]). Dutson testified 
that he considered defendant a friend and a gang associate, that 
loyalty is an attribute of gang membership, and that he never 
discussed with anyone pinning the blame on defendant (R. 132 
[238-42]). Dutson also disclosed that in exchange for the 
State's agreement to amend an aggravated arson charge from a 
first degree felony to attempted aggravated arson, a second 
2
 Dutson testified that State's Exhibit 1, previously 
identified by Mary Archuleta as a chart of her home (R. 131 
[71]), as the house he and his cohorts fire bombed (R. 132 
[232]). 
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degree felony, to dismiss another charge, and to recommend 
probation instead of prison, he would testify truthfully (R. 132 
[242-43]). The State also agreed to inform Dutson's sentencing 
judge of his extraordinary service in testifying in this case. 
The extraordinary service referred to Dutson's willingness to 
testify in the face of fear of retaliation from the gang (R. 132 
[243-44]). 
On cross-examination, Dutson acknowledged that the Trujillo 
shooting angered him and that he began plotting revenge with 
Chacon (R. 132 [244]). However, he insisted that all those 
involved planned the fire bombing together (R. 132 [245]). 
Dutson reiterated that his agreement with the State was based on 
his testifying truthfully (R. 132 [247]). In response to defense 
counsel's final question, to wit: would he tell a lie to avoid 
years in prison, Dutson responded, "Not sworn in court—that would 
block [me] from doing it" (R. 132 [248-49]). 
On redirect examination, Dutson asserted that no one had 
suggested to him that he lie and that his attorney had advised 
him to tell the whole truth (R. 132 [249-50]). In response to 
the prosecutor's asking if he had lied under oath, Dutson 
responded: "No. I have no reason to lie. I am not up here to 
get Miquel. I don't hate Miguel. This is just some stuff that 
happened. We were all together. And I am just doing my part of 
the bargain" (R. 132 [250]). Dutson also expected that if he 
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lied under oath that he would wind up in prison for as much as 
five years to life (R. 132 [251]). 
The Murder3 
The information alleged that in the early morning of 
February 22, 1996, defendant, along with Carter and Lopes, went 
to the residence of Jimmy DeHerrera with the intent to kill the 
residents in retaliation for the Trujillo shooting one week 
earlier (Murder PI. 5). There they found Joey Miera asleep on 
the floor, and through an open window defendant shot Miera twice 
in the head with a .20 gauge shotgun, killing him (Murder PI. 5, 
80). Information about defendant's involvement in the killing 
was obtained from Chacon and Dutson and Elizabeth Chacon, 
defendant's girlfriend (Murder PI. 80-81). According to 
Elizabeth Chacon, defendant confessed killing Miera, though he 
later solicited her for an alibi (Murder PI. 81). In a 
mirandized interview with police, defendant admitted that he had 
carried a gun to the crime scene, but denied using it (Murder PI. 
81). Defendant also admitted that he was one of the original 
founders of the King Mafia Disciples (Murder PI. 80). 
3
 The facts bearing on the murder are drawn from the 
information and the trial court's findings and conclusions 
concerning the applicability of the "gang" enhancement (Murder 
PI. 3-5, 79-84), and are not disputed on appeal. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I — Evidence in support of defendant's aggravated arson 
conviction was overwhelming• Witnesses testified consistently 
and in detail that defendant actively participated in the 
planning, preparation and execution of the arson. Although the 
principal witnesses were, with one exception, defendant's 
accomplices who received leniency or immunity, their testimony is 
legally sufficient for a conviction. Defendant cites no 
authority supporting reversal based on accomplice testimony in 
circumstances remotely comparable to this case, and in any case, 
the jury received an instruction, drafted by defendant, 
cautioning them on the use of accomplice testimony. Contrary to 
defendant's claim, which identifies minor inconsistencies, the 
accomplices' testimony was uniformly consistent on all essential 
points and obviously credible to the jury. 
POINT II — The prosecutor's remark in closing, referring to the 
significance of the case to the victims and danger posed to them 
by the offense was a reasonable response to defense counsel's 
earlier stating that the case was important to defendant and was 
a statement whose accuracy is not challenged. Even if the remark 
was improper it was not prejudicial. The remark was brief and 
not unduly emphasized, the trial court sustained defendant's 
objection, the jury was instructed both when the remark was made 
and when it retired to consider only the evidence in the case and 
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not argument of counsel, the court observed the jury and noted no 
adverse reaction, and evidence of guilt was overwhelming. 
POINT III — The Court should decline to consider defendant's 
challenge to his plea of guilty to murder because the challenge 
is raised for the first time on appeal, defendant having failed 
to move to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court. In any 
case, the claim that the trial court failed to strictly comply 
with the requirements of rule 11, Utah Rules of Evidence, by not 
informing him during the plea colloquy of the possibility of 
consecutive sentences is without merit. Defendant's plea 
affidavit stated the possibility of consecutive sentences, and 
the trial court fully and adequately incorporated the affidavit 
into the record 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I - THE EVIDENCE WAS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ARSON. 
Defendant principally claims that because the only evidence 
of defendant's involvement in the arson was alleged inconsistent 
testimony of accomplices, who were offered either leniency or 
immunity for their testimony, reasonable jurors should have 
entertained a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. Br. App. at 
12. Defendant's claim fails because the jury plainly recognized 
that the evidence was consistent on all essential point, 
overwhelmingly inculpated defendant and was credible. 
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A. The Standard of Review. 
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence in 
support of a conviction, this Court "will review the evidence and 
all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light 
most favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Gibson, 908 
P.2d 352, 355 (Utah App. 1995)(quoting State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 
1150, 1156 (Utah 1991)), cert, denied, 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996). 
"When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 
conviction, [the reviewing court] will reverse the conviction 
only when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted.1 State v. Ouada. 918 P.2d 883, 887 (Utah App. 1996) 
(quoting State v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1988)). 
In State v. Goddard. the court "reemphasize[d] the limited 
role of an appellate court," in reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence in a criminal conviction. State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 
540, 543 (Utah 1994): 
In such cases, we afford great deference to the jury 
verdict. State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 784-85 (Utah 
1991). We will not sit as a second fact finder, nor 
will we determine the credibility of witnesses. That 
is the prerogative of the jury. "Where there is any 
evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from it, from which findings of all the elements 
of the crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt, our 
inquiry is complete and we will sustain the verdict." 
State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989), cert, 
denied. 494 U.S. 1090 (1990). 
Id. 
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B. The Evidence Amply Supports the Reasonableness 
of the Jury's Verdict of Defendant's Guilt, 
As recited in the information (Arson Pi. 7-8), Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-103(1) (b) (1995), provides, in pertinent part: 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means 
of fire or explosives he intentionally and unlawfully 
damages: 
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a 
participant in the offense is in the structure or 
vehicle. 
In the early morning hours of February 18, 1996, the home of 
Mary Archuleta, located at 1259 West 500 South, was fire-bombed, 
resulting in fire in the front room and the adjacent porch of the 
house (R. 131 [70]; R. 132 [256, 290]). One of the occupant's 
recalled that the attack occurred at about 3:30 a.m. (R. 131 
[104]).4 Officer Payne concluded that the resulting fire at the 
Archuleta residence was an arson, and Fire Investigator Long 
concluded that the fire was intentionally set to burn the entire 
house down by the use of four incendiary devices constructed of 
gasoline-filled bottles with wicks thrown into various rooms of 
the house (R. 132 [256, 263, 281-82, 290]). One of incendiary 
devices was constructed of an "Ice 800" bottle, another of a 
quart-sized "Miller" beer bottle (R. 132 [256-62]). No usable or 
identifiable fingerprints were found on these two items (R. 132 
[287-88]). The victims did not see the perpetrators (R. 131 [90, 
4
 Officer Payne, also, testified that at about 3:30 a.m. he 
was investigating an unrelated matter when an occupant in a car 
passing by informed him that a house "down the street" was on 
fire. Officer Payne followed the car to the Archuleta residence 
(R. 132 [255]). 
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100, 114]) . 
However, four witnesses for the State—Melissa Chacon, David 
Samora, Wanda Fox, and Gustave Dutson-collectively and 
consistently testified as to defendant's knowing and intentional 
involvement in the offense: (1) defendant, along with Lopes and 
Carter, were members of the King Mafia Disciples gang (R. 131 
[116-119, 181]; R. 132 [212-13]), (2) the fire-bombing was in 
retaliation for the shooting of a fellow gang member, Davin 
Trujillo, by a rival gang (R. 131 [120-21, 123-26]; R. 132 [218-
20]); (3) defendant was personally angered by the Trujillo 
shooting (R. 131 [178]; R. 132 [218]); (4) defendant, along with 
codefendants Lopes, Carter, and Dutson, were present at Fox's 
apartment in the early morning hours of February 18, 1996 (R. 131 
[116-19, 123-32, 182-83]; R. 132 [221-22]); (5) defendant 
gathered privately with codefendants and actively participated in 
the planning of the retaliation and the construction of the 
incendiary devices used to effect the fire-bombing (R. 131 [123-
26, 134-35, 175-77, 187]; R. 132 [223-26]); (6) the incendiary 
devices consisted of four quart-sized beer bottles, three of 
which "Miller" and one "Ice 800," filled with gasoline and 
stuffed with rag wicks (R. 131 [135-36, 187-89]); R. 132 [223-25, 
228]);5 (7) Fox and Samora supplied the gasoline (R. 131 [133, 
5
 There was some slight inconsistency in the size of the 
beer bottles. Chacon testified on direct examination that all 
four bottles were quart-sized, but on cross examination thought 
one was regular ("small") sized (R. 131 [135, 153]) . Fox thought 
20 
175, 184]; R. 132 [222]); (8) Dutson and Chacon supplied the 
gloves and masks (R. 131 [137-38]; R. 132 [220]); (9) each of the 
four conspirators left the apartment at about 3:00 a.m. holding 
one gasoline-filled bottle stuffed with a wick, and with gloves 
and a mask (R. 131 [137-39, 188-91]; R. 132 [228-31]); (10) all 
of the conspirators returned within one-half hour to one hour (R. 
131 [139, 189]). 
As a co-perpetrator of the arson itself, Dutson testified 
that defendant drove the party to the Archuleta home (R. 132 
[230, 232]). After Dutson wrote gang symbols on a garage shed, 
the party spread out around the house, he to the front, the 
others to the rear (R. 132 [233-35]). Dutson lit the wick in his 
bottle and threw it through a front window, which started a fire 
(R. 132 [233-35]). He also heard breaking windows from the back 
of the house (R. 132 [235]). They all then ran to the car and 
drove back to Fox's house (R. 132 [236]). While in the car, 
Dutson heard each of the conspirator's, including defendant, 
assert that each of their fire bombs had gone into the house and 
start a fire (R. 132 [237]). Upon the gang's return, Chacon 
heard defendant say that he was on the side of the house, but was 
not sure whether or not his bottle had gone off (R. 131 [140]). 
Also in response to Chacon's inquiry about whether "they did it," 
all the bottles were thirty-two ounces (R. 131 [188]. Dutson 
testified that they used quart-sized and forty ounce bottles (R. 
132 [223]). 
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Lopes responded, "Yes, we did" (R. 131 [190]), 
The sufficiency of the evidence is patent. 
C. Defendant Fails to Cite Any Relevant Authority 
that the Testimony of Accomplices' is Eroded by 
Their Involvement in this Offense. 
Defendant argues that because defendant's conviction is 
based on the testimony of witnesses involved in the offense, 
evidence of guilt is so speculative that the inference of guilt 
is unwarranted. Br. App. at 15. However, authority cited by 
defendant is either so distinguishable or downright unsupportive 
of defendant's position that it might reasonably be cited by the 
State in support of defendant's guilt. See United States v. 
Yoakam, 116 F.3d 1346, 1349-50 (10th Cir. 1997)(finding arson 
conviction the product of speculation and conjecture "because 
neither direct nor circumstantial evidence support[ed] the 
government's theory that [the defendant] was motivated to commit 
arson by pressure to enter an unfavorable business arrangement," 
and nothing other than the defendant's presence at the building, 
from which he exited only moments after other employees, linked 
him to the fire); United States v. Earl, 27 F.3d 423, 425-26 (9th 
Cir. 1994)(reversing drug conviction where an informant's 
contradictory testimony and some evidence linking the defendant 
to the premises failed to establish the defendant's constructive 
possession of a drug house); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 194-
98 (Utah 1987)(reversing conviction for child sex abuse largely 
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founded on very young victims' "extraordinarily confused and 
contradictory testimony" and victims' mother testimony, which was 
significantly inconsistent with the rendition she gave to the 
police); State v. Smith. 706 P.2d 1052, 1055-57 (Utah 
1985)(citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7(1) (1995) in support of 
conviction based on testimony of two accomplices, one receiving 
leniency in plea bargain and the other receiving immunity, in 
spite of directly conflicting evidence of the defendant's 
participation in the offenses);6 State v. McCullar, 674 P.2d 117, 
118 (Utah 1993)(per curiam)(finding corroborated testimony of two 
accomplices who received immunity sufficient for conviction even 
though victims could not identify defendant as a perpetrator); 
State v. Pratt. 475 P.2d 1013, 1014 (Utah 1970)(reversing 
conviction under prior law where victim's testimony was 
materially contradicted by defendant and two other witness's 
testimony was "so self-contradictory, vague and uncertain that it 
must be deemed wholly insufficient to corroborate the testimony 
6
 Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7 (1995) provides: 
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated 
testimony of an accomplice. 
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to 
the jury may be given to the effect that such 
uncorroborated testimony should be viewed with caution, 
and such an instruction shall be given if the trial judge finds the testimony of the accomplice to be self 
contradictory, uncertain or improbable. 
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of [the accomplice]").7 
Contrary to defendant's remarkable claim, the facts of this 
case do not exhibit inconsistencies remotely akin to those of 
Walker, Pratt, Earl, and Yoakam. Br. App. at 17. Rather, the 
consistent, undisputed facts recited above, casually overlooked 
by defendant, are clearly sufficient to support a conclusion that 
defendant acted as a principal in committing aggravated arson. 
Refusing to acknowledge the overwhelming facts in support of 
guilt, defendant attacks the nature of the source of those facts, 
defendant's accomplices who received leniency in exchange for 
their testimony, and whose testimony, he alleges, is therefore 
inherently unreliable. Br. App. at 17-19. The State 
acknowledges that historically Utah regarded accomplice testimony 
as inherently suspect: 
"We recognize that an accomplice may be motivated 
7
 When Pratt was decided, the governing law concerning 
accomplice testimony was set out in Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 
(1953). Pratt., 475 P.2d at 1014 n.2. Section 77-31-18 provided: 
A conviction shall not be had on the testimony of 
an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other 
evidence, which in itself and without the aid of the 
testimony of the accomplice tends to connect the 
defendant with the commission of the offense; and the 
corroboration shall not be sufficient, if it merely 
shows the commission of the offense or the 
circumstances thereof. 
The Utah legislature repealed this section and enacted a new 
section 77-31-18 (Supp. 1979), which provided that "[a] 
conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an 
accomplice." This section was later recodified at Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-17-7 (1982). See State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1218 
(Utah 1986). Thus, because the standard for testing the weight 
of accomplice testimony has been reversed by statute since Pratt, 
that case is in nowise proper authority in this case. 
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to falsify because of a desire to blame someone else in 
connection with the crime; or in the hope of obtaining 
leniency; or the very fact that he is involved in crime 
may tend to impair his credibility. These combine to 
justify looking upon his testimony with caution and 
refusing to permit a conviction to rest upon his word 
alone, as our statute provides." 
State v. Ross. 573 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Utah 1978)(quoting State v. 
Sinclair. 15 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 465, 467-468 (1964). In 
support of that caution, the court in Ross, relied on Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953), see supra n.6, requiring that accomplice 
testimony in support of a conviction be corroborated. Id. ("This 
statute has been a part of the law of the state and territory of 
Utah since 1878, and is deeply imbedded in the wisdom of our 
system of law."). 
However, Utah abandoned to a considerable extent its 
historical scepticism regarding uncorroborated accomplice 
testimony when it enacted Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-1 (1982), 
providing for conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an 
accomplice. See supra n.6. In Smith, the court found the 
testimony of two accomplices, one receiving leniency in plea 
bargain and the other receiving blanket immunity, sufficient for 
conviction even though the defendant denied participating in the 
offenses. Smith. 706 P.2d at 1054-56. Notwithstanding 
conflicting evidence and defendant's denial that he had 
participated in the offenses, the court noted: "However, the 
jury is not obligated to believe that evidence. This court is 
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obliged to accept that version of the facts which the jury 
apparently believed and which supports the verdict." Id. at 
1056. The court then noted that the version of the facts 
supporting the verdict showed that all the elements of the 
offense were present, and therefore, "the evidence was not so 
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not have 
determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the [offenses]." Id^ at 1056-57. 
A cursory review of the facts, set out above in support of 
defendant's participation in the aggravated arson, supports the 
same conclusion in this case. In the face of this evidence, 
defendant's assertions that the jury was "[invited] to presume 
that Flores must have been involved in the arson simply because 
he [might have been] a gang member," or that apart from any 
alleged gang affiliation "other indicators of Flores' motive or 
intent to commit arson are lacking," see Br. App. at 19, 20, are 
utterly unfounded. Additionally, defendant's concern about 
suspect accomplice testimony is overstated. 
Samora was granted immunity, and Chacon and Dutson both 
received leniency through reduced and dismissed charges in 
exchange for their pleas to second degree felonies and their 
truthful testimony at trial (R. 131 [179, 156-59]; R. 132 [242-
43]. Further, Chacon admitted that unless she cooperated with 
the State she would lose custody of her daughter (R. 131 [154-
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55]). However, it does not necessarily follow that testimony is 
false because it is given in connection with an offer of immunity 
or through a plea bargain, especially where, as in this case, the 
jury found that the challenged witnesses were credible. In 
addition to the overall consistency of their testimony, both 
Chacon and Dutson emphatically and convincingly testified that 
their agreements required their truthful testimony, that they 
risked prison if they did lie under oath, and that they were, in 
fact, telling the truth (R. 131 [159-61]; R. 132 [248-50]).8 
Indeed, Dutson's credibility was likely enhanced by the fact that 
he risked retaliation from the King Mafia Disciples merely by 
testifying for the State (R. 132 [243-44]). Commensurate with 
the limited value of his testimony, Samora was only asked if he 
was testifying with immunity, which he acknowledged (R. 131 
[179]). Finally, although she assisted in obtaining the 
gasoline, Fox was never charged with any offense, contrary to 
defendant's assertion, see Br. App. at 18, and never offered 
immunity for her testimony (R. 131 [199-201]). Her testimony 
alone, not subject to the traditional caution regarding 
accomplice testimony, plus the undisputed fact of the fire-
8
 Chacon also made clear that her cooperation with the 
State would not compel her to lie in order "get her daughter 
back," because her daughter would be taken care of whether or not 
she went to prison (R. 131 [163]). Dutson also stated that he 
did not hate defendant and was not out to get defendant by 
testifying, but merely doing his part of the bargain (R. 132 
[250]). 
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bombing itself, was sufficient to convict defendant as an 
accomplice.9 
Moreover, as in Smith, 706 P.2d at 1055 n.3, and pursuant to 
section 77-17-7(2), the trial court gave an instruction, drafted 
by defendant (Arson PI. 54), cautioning the jury on the proper 
regard of testimony of accomplices receiving leniency through 
plea agreements (Jury Instruction #9, Arson PI. 66, attached at 
Addendum). The jury was additionally instructed that "[i]rt 
judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the 
witnesses you have a right to take into consideration their bias, 
their interest in the result of the suit, or any probable motive 
or lack thereof to testify fairly, if any is shown" (Jury 
Instruction #8, Arson PI. 65). On these facts the jury's 
reliance on the challenged witness's testimony not unreasonable. 
D. Alleged Inconsistencies in the Challenged Witness's 
Testimony are Immaterial in Themselves and Alongside 
the Mass of Consistent. Material Evidence, Corroborated 
by Undisputed Testimony of Official Investigators. 
In further support of his claim that the testimony of Fox, 
Samora, Chacon, and Dutson is suspect, defendant claims that 
9
 Fox testified that (1) defendant was a King Mafia 
Disciple gang member (R. 131 [181); (2) that he was at her 
apartment with other gang members in the early morning of 
February 18, 1996 (R. 131 [182-83]); (3) gang members took the 
gasoline into her bathroom, from which they, including defendant, 
later emerged wearing masks and gloves, each holding 32-ounce 
bottles of gasoline with rags sticking out of them (R. 131 [187-
89]); and (4) codefendant Lopes, upon returning with the other 
three conspirators, admitted that they "did it* (R. 131 190]). 
The jury was given an accomplice liability instruction (Arson PI. 
83) . 
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their testimony is "rife with inconsistencies." Br. App. at 21-
22. In the face of consistent, corroborative evidence, this 
claim is without merit. 
Defendant's Presence at Fox's Apartment 
Samora did not recall seeing defendant at Fox's apartment 
the night before the bombing, but also admitted that his memory 
of the evening before the fire-bombing was fuzzy, as was 
evidenced by his testimony generally (R. 131 [168-69, 174, 176]). 
However, defendant misrepresents Dutson's and Chacon's testimony, 
and with blatant disregard of the record suggests that Dutson, 
Chacon, and Fox suspiciously remembered defendant, but not the 
other conspirators. Br. App. at 22. In response to whether 
there had been other people at Fox's apartment who had left, 
Dutson said: "I think there had been. I was pretty drunk so I 
don't remember that night very good" (R. 132 [222]). In fact, 
Dutson was overly modest about his memory, since the record 
plainly shows that he testified at length and in detail about the 
events of that night. Most importantly, both he and Chacon 
consistently testified that defendant, along with Dutson, Lopes, 
and Carter, were at Fox's apartment to plan and prepare the arson 
and, in fact, committed the offense (R. 132 [221-233, 236-37]; R. 
131 [116-19, 123-40). Regarding Fox, defendant admits that she 
recalled that defendant arrived at her apartment with the other 
three conspirators. Br. App. at 22. In sum, defendant's 
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assertion that "none of the accomplices had any memory of others 
present except, conveniently, Flores," see Br. App. at 22, is a 
clear misrepresentation of the record. 
Purpose of gathering at Fox's Apartment 
Defendant suggests that because Dutson said there was 
partying and drinking going on at Fox's apartment on the evening 
before the arson, and because Chacon and Fox indicated that there 
was no partying or drinking and that people had gathered to 
discuss the Trujillo shooting, the alleged contradiction "bears 
upon whether Flores was at the Fox apartment to be with friends 
on a Saturday night or whether he was actually part of the 
conspiracy to bomb the Archuleta home." Br. App. at 22-23. A 
cursory review of the facts set out above, Part IB, detailing 
defendant's active involvement in the planning and preparation of 
the offense, notwithstanding any partying or drinking that might 
have been going on, is ample response to defendant's argument. 
Defendant's Presence at Crime Scene 
Defendant argues that his presence at the crime scene should 
be considered doubtful because Dutson, who did not see defendant 
throw an incendiary device, assumed that defendant did so because 
he heard back windows breaking, while "Chacon . . . testified 
that Miguel said he threw a bomb in the side window." Br. App. 
at 23. The distinction is trivial given the hurried events of 
the arson, and especially in light of Dutson's testimony that all 
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of the conspirators said they had thrown their incendiary devices 
and Chacon's testimony that defendant admitted that he was at the 
site, but that his bottle might not have gone off (R. 132 [235-
36]; R. 131 [140}) .10 
Chacon's and Fox's Disingenuous Claims of Non-Involvement 
Defendant points out that Fox admitted she supplied the 
gasoline at Chacon's request, that Chacon admitted she (Chacon) 
was a Queen Mafia Disciple, and that both Chacon and Dutson 
acknowledged that Chacon had purchased the gloves and masks. 
However, because both Fox and Chacon claimed they merely watched 
television while the incendiary devices were prepared in the 
bathroom, from which the strong smell of gasoline emanated, their 
disingenuous claims of non-involvement suggest that they were 
shifting blame from themselves to defendant. Br. App. at 23-24. 
Insofar as Chacon's involvement is concerned, and to a much 
lesser extent Fox's, defendant's claim has some merit. It is not 
surprising that an accomplice (Chacon) or one privy to illegality 
(Fox) would downplay their involvement in a serious offense. 
However, Chacon plainly acknowledged her involvement in admitting 
10
 To the extent defendant attempts to suggest a conflict in 
the testimony about whether defendant was positioned at either a 
back or side window, defendant improperly draws on the record. 
Dutson never said he assumed defendant threw an incendiary 
device. Rather, he simply said that he heard windows breaking in 
the back of the house, from where he later saw his cohorts 
running (R. 132 [235-36]). Chacon testified that defendant 
reported that "he was on the side of the house, but he was not 
sure if his bottle went off or not" (R. 131 [140]). Thus, the 
witnesses did not contradict each other at all about which 
windows defendant might have broken. 
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she and Dutson purchased the gloves and masks to effect the 
retaliation, and Fox acknowledged her purchase of the gasoline 
(R. 131 [137, 184-87]). More importantly, any downplaying by 
Chacon and Fox of their involvement has little effect on 
defendant's obviously much greater involvement. 
Discrepancies Concerning Construction of Incendiary Devices 
Defendant correctly notes that Dutson said the beer bottles 
came from Fox's apartment, whereas Chacon said Samora went to get 
the bottles from outside the apartment, which Samora denied. 
Defendant also claims similar discrepancies in the source of the 
wicks, Dutson stating that ripped up towels were used, Chacon 
stating that Dutson asked Fox for an old T-shirt, and Fox stating 
she did not know where the rags came from. Br. App. at 24. The 
discrepancies concerning the source of the bottles pale alongside 
the fact that Chacon testified that quart-sized "Miller" bottles 
were used and Dutson said that quart-sized bottles, including an 
"Ice 800" were used, the same type of bottles which were 
recovered from the arson premises (R. 131 [153]; R. 132 [228, 
256-62]). There is no significant discrepancy concerning the 
wicks because, contrary to defendant's bald assertion, Dutson 
testified that they were made of "towels or something, rags" (R. 
132 [225]). Thus, Dutson's testimony does not contradict 
Chacon's, but rather indicates that he was not concerned with the 
source of the wicks. 
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Alleged Discrepancies Concerning Conspirators' Departure 
Defendant claims discrepancies about whether the 
conspirators lingered before leaving Fox's apartment and whether 
they were wearing gloves and masks. Br. App. at 24-25. These 
alleged discrepancies are at most trivial. In fact, defendant 
acknowledges that Chacon stated the four conspirators had their 
masks and gloves in their pockets, and that Dutson stated that 
they hid their masks and gloves under their clothing (R. 131 
[138]; R. 132 [230-31]). Moreover, contrary to defendant's 
assertion, Chacon's testimony suggests that the party shortly 
exited the apartment after trying on the masks and gloves, in 
basic conformity with Fox's testimony (R. 131 [137, 189]). 
In sum, defendant has failed to show that the substantially 
consistent testimony of accomplices is so inherently improbable 
or sufficiently inconclusive that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime. 
POINT II - THE PROSECUTOR'S REMARK REFERRING TO THE VICTIMS, 
IN RESPONSE TO DEFENSE COUNSEL'S CLOSING ARGUMENT, 
WAS ARGUABLY PROPER, AND EVEN IF NOT, WAS AT MOST 
HARMLESS. 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor's reference in closing 
argument to the circumstances of the victims was reversible error 
because it was irrelevant to elements of the charge and 
calculated to inflame the jury to vindicate the victims in the 
face of allegedly weak evidence. Defendant's lengthy argument 
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blows out of proportion an arguably proper, innocuous remark, and 
ignores the circumstances in which the remark was made, the 
propriety of the trial court's response, the plethora of curative 
instructions, and the compelling weight of evidence of 
defendant's guilt. 
A. The Standard of Review. 
"This court will reverse on the basis of prosecutorial 
misconduct only if defendant has shown that 
the actions or remarks of [prosecuting] counsel call to 
the attention of the jury a matter it would not be 
justified in considering in determining its verdict 
and, if so, under the circumstances of the particular 
case, whether the error is substantial and prejudicial 
such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its 
absence, there would have been a more favorable result. 
State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992)(quoting 
State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah App. 1990), quoting 
State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 287 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 
494 U.S. 1090 (1990)). Further elaborating on the standard of 
review, this Court stated: 
In determining whether a given statement constitutes 
prosecutorial misconduct, the statement must be viewed 
in light of the totality of the evidence presented at 
trial. Further, because the trial court is in the best 
position to determine the impact of a statement upon 
the proceedings, its rulings on whether the 
prosecutor's conduct merits a mistrial will not be 
overturned absent an abuse of discretion. 
Id. (citing Gardner, 789 P.2d at 287). 
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B. The Factual Background. 
At the conclusion of his closing argument, defense counsel 
stated: 
But, in short, there have been many, many 
important trials that have taken place in this 
courtroom. But for Miguel Flores, this is most 
important, and I would submit for you this is the most 
important. 
(R. 132 [319]). 
In the course of his rebuttal closing, the prosecutor made 
the challenged remark, followed by defense counsel's objections 
and the trial court's ruling: 
MR. YBARRA [PROSECUTOR]: Now, Mr. Fratto [defense 
counsel] ends by saying, this is a most important 
trial. It's important to the defendant, of course. 
Many important cases have been tried in this court. 
But I want to remind you as well that there is the 
State in this case who also considers this an important 
case. And there are victims. There is Mary Archuleta, 
little Joseph Herrera and Candido Herrera and other 
people in this house that came close to burning to 
death. 
MR. FRATTO: I'll object. I'll object to that line of 
argument. That's improper. It tends to put to the 
jury that they are to do something other than use their 
prejudices. They are to be dispassionate. 
MR. YBARRA: Your Honor, he brought about the point 
about this being an important case. 
THE COURT: Let me indicate this: I am going to 
sustain the objection. The jury has been reminded that 
the statements of counsel are not evidence and they are 
not to consider them as evidence. I'll ask that you 
move on. 
MR. YBARRA: I simply make the point that this is an 
important case. 
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(R. 132 [325-26]). 
After the close of argument, defense counsel moved for a 
mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor's remark suggested 
that the purpose of a guilty verdict was to "vindicate the 
victims or society in general because expressed it was a horrific 
crime," and served only to inflame the jury (R. 132 [328]). 
The prosecutor responded by noting that it was defense 
counsel who first brought up the importance of the outcome of the 
case to defendant, that defense counsel's reference was an 
improper appeal to the passions of the jury, and that it would be 
improper to allow to go unrebutted defense counsel's suggestion 
that only defendant's interest was of importance in the case. 
The prosecutor further stated that the State never said it was 
important to obtain a verdict, but only that the case was 
important to the State and that other persons also had an 
important interest in the matter (R. 132 [328-29]). 
The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, noting 
that the jury had heard and would review again instructions 
stating that statements of counsel were not evidence and that 
they were not to base their verdict on passion or prejudice (R. 
132 [329]). The court concluded by stating, 
I believe that as I was observing the jury when 
the statements were made, I didn't observe anything out 
of the ordinary in terms of expressions or that this 
meant something special to them when Mr. Ybarra made 
the statement. They were instructed to disregard it. 
And I believe that is a sufficient instruction for me 
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to give them. I don't think it was a statement that 
they will remember or attach any special significance 
to. 
(R. 132 [329-30). 
C. The Prosecutor's Remark was Arguably Proper, 
and Even if Improper, Harmless at Most. 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor's remark improperly 
drew the juror's attention to the near deaths of the victims, 
information which was not at issue in determining guilt for 
aggravated arson. Br. App. at 27. However, in State v. 
Williams. 656 P.2d 450 (Utah 1982), an aggravated robbery case, 
the defendant also alleged prosecutorial misconduct based on the 
prosecutor's inviting the jury to consider what might have 
happened had the victim of the robbery been injured. Id. at 453. 
Although there was evidence of the defendant's possession of a 
knife seconds before the robbery, and evidently no necessity to 
refer to the victim's possible injuries, the supreme court held 
that the prosecutor's argument was not improper. Id. at 453-54. 
See also State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 
1982)(finding that prosecutor's reference to the "problem that we 
have with drugs in our community" reasonably called to the jury's 
attention the seriousness of the issues). 
More particularly, the prosecutor's remark was reasonable 
rebuttal to defense counsel's focusing the jury on the paramount 
importance of the case to defendant without reference to the 
significance the victim's would also attach to it (R. 132 [325]). 
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In State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), during closing 
argument, defense counsel emphasized that the defendant would 
probably be a 67-year-old man when he got out of prison following 
a life sentence, "broken and old and incapable of causing damage 
to anyone." 750 P.2d at 559-60. In response, the prosecutor 
questioned whether defendant would be a better person fifteen 
years hence when he got out of prison given the lack of remorse 
he had shown during the trial. Id. at 560. Defendant then 
contended on appeal that the prosecutor's comments "were 
misleading and had the potential of improperly influencing its 
decision on the death penalty." Id. 
In rejecting this argument, the Utah Supreme Court found it 
significant that "it was defense counsel who first commented that 
in Utah, parole is a possibility under a life sentence." Id. 
The court held that while the prosecutor's remarks "were arguably 
improper and prejudicial . . . , his comments, when placed within 
the context of his and defense counsel's entire arguments, fall 
within the ambit of permitted conduct." Id. See also Creviston, 
646 P.2d at 754 (no misconduct in prosecutor's comments on the 
significance of the defendant's presence at drug sale, made in 
direct response to a theory of the defense); State v. Valdez, 30 
Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422, 425 (Utah 1993)(no prosecutorial 
misconduct where the prosecutor's rebuttal was in direct reply to 
theory advanced by defense in its final argument and remarks were 
within the range of reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence); State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153, 157 (Utah App. 
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1997)(finding no misconduct in arguing in rebuttal that the 
defendant had the option to call missing witness where the 
defendant opened the door by arguing in closing that he should be 
acquitted based on the State's failure to call the witness). 
In this case, the prosecutor's remark was plainly triggered 
by defense counsel's statement about the importance of the case 
to defendant and is barely more than a statement that there were 
victims involved. Moreover, there can be no challenge to the 
accuracy of the prosecutor's assertion that the victims came 
close to burning to death. The fire investigator testified that 
if all the incendiary devices had gone off, the entire structure 
would have been involved and probably collapsed before the fire 
department arrived, and based on the placement of those devices, 
Mr. Herrera's chances of survival were small (R. 132 [291-92]). 
Defendant's principal challenge to the prosecutor's remark 
is that it served to inflame the jury into basing its verdict on 
the vindication of the victims. Br. App. at 27. In aid of this 
challenge, defendant grossly mischaracterizes the quality of the 
remark, arguing that it conjured up an "horrific image of an 
event which never happened." Br. App. 30. In support, defendant 
cites authority the facts of which are substantially 
distinguishable from those in this case.11 In fact, the 
11
 Defendant cites, see Br. App. at 29, the following cases: 
State v. Carter, 888 P.2d~T29, 650-652 (Utah 1995) (substantial 
victim impact evidence found inadmissible under capital 
sentencing statute); State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1229-30 
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prosecutor's remark is a brief reference to a mere potential 
impact, an impact supported by the evidence. 
Even if the prosecutor's remark was improper, it was not 
harmful. See State v. Tavlor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1298 (Utah App. 
1994)("Only if the improper statements are deemed to be harmful 
will they require reversal.") (citation omitted). 
First, the prosecutor only briefly commented on the victims' 
circumstances, and in accord with the trial court's ruling, moved 
on and concluded his argument (R. 132 [325-26] ) . Cf. Gardner,, 
789 P.2d 273, 287 (Utah 1989) (prosecutor's calling the defendant 
by the wrong name was not prejudicial where "[t]he reference, 
taken in context, was inadvertent, was immediately corrected, and 
did not interrupt the flow of the proceedings or focus the jury's 
attention on an improper basis for the verdict"); State v. White, 
880 P.2d 18, 23 (Utah App. 1994) (finding persuasive, in harmless 
error analysis, that prosecutor did not "unduly emphasize or 
otherwise misuse" exhibit of bloody pants). 
Second, the trial court sustained defendant's objection, 
(Utah 1989)(error to admit six-minute videotape focusing on 
victim's bloody, beaten body and gaping stab wounds under rule 
403, Utah Rules of Evidence); State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 983 
(Utah 1989)(characterizing as "repulsive," "vulgar," and 
"profane," defendant's letter to murdered victim's father, 
written for the purpose of taunting and inflicting guilt on the 
victim's father); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 476 (Utah 
1988)(improper admission of gruesome photos depicting gashes and 
holes in victim's skull); cf. State v. White, 880 P.2d 18, 23 
(Utah App. 1994) (distinguishing blood-stained pants that were 
merely "not particularly pleasant" from gruesome photographs, one 
of three types of presumptively prejudicial evidence shifting the 
burden of admissibility identified in State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 
1239, 1256 (Utah 1988), cert, denied, 504 U.S. 911 (19$2)). 
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immediately instructed the jury that statements of counsel were 
not evidence, and instructed the prosecutor to move on, thus 
minimizing any prejudicial effect (R. 132 [326]). Additionally, 
the jury was instructed in writing that (1) "[t]he law forbids 
you to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, 
passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling" (Jury 
Instruction 3, Arson PI. 58); and (2) "[s]tatements and argument 
of counsel are not evidence" and "[the jury is] to consider only 
the evidence in the case" (Jury Instruction 4, Arson PI. 60). 
Notwithstanding defendant's argument, Utah appellate courts have 
repeatedly acknowledged and relied upon the efficacy of curative 
and limiting instructions in cases of alleged misconduct.12 
Third, the trial court observed the jury when the statements 
were made and "didn't observe anything out of the ordinary in 
terms of expressions or that this meant something special to them 
12
 See State v. Thompson, 776 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1989) (if 
the jury was inclined to be influenced by the State's improper 
remarks, "the jury instructions that were given cured any 
potential error"); Tillman, 750 P.2d at 561 (no prejudice where 
prosecutor's rebuttal in closing was merely a response issue 
raised by defense counsel and jury admonished to consider only 
evidence introduced at trial); Creviston, 646 P.2d at 754 
(finding no error where jury cautioned to consider only the 
evidence and to disregard utterances not having a basis in the 
evidence); State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986) 
(plainly implying that prosecutor's lengthy and improper comments 
on matters outside evidence would have 6een cured if the court 
had granted the defendant's objection and admonished the jury to 
disregard the comments); State v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550, 550 (Utah 
App. 1993)(prosecutor's incomplete statement of law not harmful 
wnere trial court gave a complete instruction on the law); State 
v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah App. 1990)(finding "the 
trial court's immediate admonition that the statement be stricken 
and that no further reference be made to the statement, rendered 
harmless the otherwise improper testimony"). 
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when Mr. Ybarra made the statement" (R. 132 [330]). See State v. 
Williams, 773 P.2d 1368, 1373 (Utah 1989)(finding no prejudice in 
witness's reference to the defendant's parole status where jury 
instructed to disregard the evidence, curative instructions 
given, and "the trial court felt that the statement was lost on 
the jury and noted that it observed no visible reaction of the 
jurors to the testimony"). 
Fourth, as set out at length in Part IB, above, the evidence 
of defendant's guilt was overwhelming and consistent with respect 
to all the significant details of the offense, not only with 
respect to the accomplices' testimony, but also as that testimony 
was confirmed by investigator's observations of the crime 
scene.13 It took the jury only 50 minutes to decide this case 
(R. 132 [330, 332]), and it's obvious that the decision was not 
based on the prosecutor's remark. 
Finally, defendant argues that, on policy grounds, 
prosecutorial misconduct should effectively be treated as per se 
reversible error, thereby nullifying harmless error analysis. 
App. Br. at 37. In State v. Tennev, 913 P.2d 750 (Utah App. 
13
 See Carter, 888 P.2d at 653 (no prejudice where improper 
victim impact testimony was relatively mild and evidence of guilt 
overwhelming); State v. Young. 853 P.2d 327, 349 (Utah 1993) 
("When there is strong proof of guilt, the conduct or remark of a 
prosecutor is not presumed prejudicial."); State v. Span. 819 
P.2d 329, 335 (Utah 1991)(prejudice "negligible" where jury would 
likely have pondered issues related to testimony improperly 
elicited and trial judge instructed the jury to disregard the 
objectionable material); State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1119 
(Utah App. 1995)(no prejudice, assuming arguendo error in 
prosecutor's remarks, in light of all the evidence). 
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1996), this Court rejected a per se prejudice claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct, noting that "[w]hile other 
jurisdictions have found that egregious misconduct by a 
prosecutor can "so color[] the proceedings that [defendant] was 
denied a fair trial . . ., Utah requires a more concrete showing 
of prejudice compared to the strength of the evidence against 
defendant." Id. at 755 (citation omitted). 
In sum, the prosecutor's reference to the importance of the 
case to the victims with a brief reference to their circumstances 
was arguably a proper response to defense counsel's informing the 
jury that the case was important to defendant. But if the remark 
was improper, it was not prejudicial. 
POINT III - THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S 
CHALLENGE TO THE PLEA-TAKING BECAUSE HE DID NOT 
MOVE TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA AND FAILS TO CLAIM 
PLAIN ERROR ON APPEAL. IN ANY CASE, BECAUSE 
THE COURT FULLY AND PROPERLY INCORPORATED THE PLEA 
AFFIDAVIT INTO THE PROCEEDINGS, THE REQUIREMENTS 
OF RULE 11 WERE STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH. 
Defendant claims that because the trial court failed to 
inform him during the plea colloquy of the possibility that 
consecutive sentences might be imposed, the court failed to 
strictly comply with the requirements of rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Evidence. App. Br. at 38.14 The claim is totally meritless and 
14
 Defendant also appears to suggest that the trial court's 
alleged failure to inform him of the possibility of consecutive 
sentences was further compounded by his having entered his plea 
with the understanding that he would receive concurrent 
sentences. Br. App. at 38. The suggestion is misleading and 
unfounded. Defendant acknowledges that, in accord with the plea 
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should not even be considered in the circumstances of the case. 
A. Because Defendant Failed to First Move to Withdraw 
His Guilty Plea in the Trial Court, His Claim Should 
Not be Reviewed on the Merits. 
Defendant did not first move to withdraw his plea before 
appealing the manner in which his plea was taken. "Defendant 
must first move to set aside the plea; he or she can not 
challenge the plea for the first time on appeal from the 
conviction." Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 343 (Utah App. 
1988). Moreover, defendant has failed to allege that the trial 
court committed plain error or that he suffered manifest 
injustice in the manner in which the court accepted his guilty 
plea to murder. See State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 774 (Utah 
affidavit (Arson PI. 59-66, attached at Addendum B) the 
prosecutor fulfilled the State's promise to recommend concurrent 
sentencing (R. 101 [3]). Br. App. at 41 n.7. Further, the plea 
affidavit states that defendant understood that the court was not 
bound by any sentencing recommendation (Arson PI. at 63). 
Also, the State notes that it principally relies on the 
adequacy of the plea affidavit and the manner in which the trial 
court incorporated the affidavit into the record in refuting 
defendant's claim. However, the record also makes clear that 
defendant had actual notice of the possibility of consecutive 
sentences not only from the trial court, but from his counsel as 
well. During the plea colloquy, the trial court confirmed with 
defendant, his counsel, and the prosecutor that the plea 
agreement included the imposition of the group criminal 
activities enhancement (popularly known as the "gang" 
enhancement) and the gun enhancement, consecutive with sentences 
imposed for defendant's other convictions (R. 101 [2-4, 13]). 
Moreover, at sentencing, defense counsel, let slip that defendant 
knew of consecutive sentencing and acknowledged that defendant 
pleaded guilty "because of representations that the State would 
not recommend consecutive sentencing" (R. 136 [5])(emphasis 
added). Since the trial court informed defendant, and defendant 
acknowledged, that any recommendations were not binding on the 
court's sentencing discretion (R. 101 [14]), it is plain in these 
circumstances that defendant, a young career criminal, knew of 
the possibility of consecutive sentencing. 
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App. 1990)(addressing voluntariness of guilty plea for the first 
time on appeal under plain error doctrine where trial court found 
to have committed multiple errors in accepting plea). 
The record plainly and readily shows that the trial court 
strictly complied with the requirements of rule 11. Therefore, 
this Court should decline to review defendant's claim on appeal. 
B. Even Considering Defendant's Claim, it is Plain 
that the Trial Court Strictly Complied with the 
Requirements of Rule 11 by Incorporating the 
Plea Affidavit into the Record. 
Rule 11(e) (4) provides: "The court may refuse to accept a 
plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may 
not accept the plea until the court has found . . . the defendant 
understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the 
plea is entered. . . . " Strict compliance with rule 11 is 
required. State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1991). A 
trial court must "personally establish that the defendant' s 
guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the 
record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her 
constitutional rights and understood the elements of the crime." 
State v. Abeyta. 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993) (per curiam). In 
addition, the trial court must determine that the defendant 
""possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the 
facts.1" State v. Breckenridae. 688 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 
1983)(citation omitted). 
However, the trial court is not "rigidly tied to the 
colloquy with the defendant [or] relegated to rote recitation of 
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the rule 11 elements when entertaining a plea." Abeyta, 852 P.2d 
at 996 (citing State v. Maauire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 n.2 (Utah 
1991) (per curiam)). 
In Maauire, the supreme court sought to "make clear that 
strict compliance can be accomplished by multiple means so long 
as no requirement of the rule is omitted and so long as the 
record reflects that the requirement has been fulfilled." Id. 
830 P.2d at 218. In furtherance of that objective, the court 
stated: 
When plea affidavits are properly incorporated in the 
record (as when the trial judge ascertains in the plea 
colloquy that the defendant has read, has understood, 
and acknowledges all the information contained 
therein), they may properly form a part of the basis 
for finding rule 11 compliance. 
Id. at 217. Quoting with approval State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 
477 (Utah App. 1991)(Russon, J., concurring), cert, denied, 836 
P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), the court further stated: 
It is critical, however, that strict Rule 11 
compliance be demonstrated on the record at the time 
the ... plea is entered. Therefore, if an affidavit is 
used to aid Rule 11 compliance, it must be addressed 
during the plea hearing. The trial court must conduct 
an inquiry to establish that the defendant understands 
the affidavit and voluntarily signed it. . . . Any 
omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must be 
clarified during the plea hearing, as must any 
uncertainties raised in the course of the plea 
colloquy. Then the affidavit itself, signed by the 
required parties, can be incorporated into the record. 
The efficiency-promoting function of the affidavit is 
thereby served, in that the court need not repeat, 
verbatim, Rule 11 inquiries that are clearly posed and 
answered in the affidavit, unless Rule 11 by its terms 
specifically requires such repetition. 
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Id. at 218.15 
Overlooking Macruire, defendant particularly relies on State 
v. Dastrup, 818 P.2d 594 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 
516 (Utah 1992). Br. App. at 40, 43.16 However, in clarifying 
the appropriate role of a properly incorporated plea affidavit 
and rejecting the view that the court's "strict compliance test 
requires a time-consuming, mechanical oral recitation of each 
element mentioned in rule 11," the supreme court specifically 
repudiated this Court's "rigid view" of "the record" adopted in 
Dastrup, which "apparently construed *the record' to mean only 
the transcript of the oral plea colloquy, thereby concluding that 
*the trial court must base its findings solely on the colloquy, 
without considering any statements made in the affidavit'". 
Maauire. 830 P.2d at 218 n.2. 
In this case, as defendant concedes, see Br. App. at 43, the 
plea affidavit stated that consecutive sentences might be imposed 
if defendant was awaiting sentencing on another offense on which 
15
 See also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah 1996) 
(looking at defendant's plea affidavit and the plea colloquy 
between defendant and the trial judge) <• State v. Mills, 8 98 P.2d 
819, 823 (Utah App. 1995)(quoting Maguire with approval in noting 
that "when plea affidavits are properly incorporated in the 
record . . . they may properly form a part of the basis for 
finding rule 11 compliance"); State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 581 
(Utah App. 1992)(finding rule 11 compliance based on proper 
incorporation of plea affidavit). 
16
 Similarly relied on by defendant and of dubious authority 
are State v. Pharris, 777 P.2d 772, 777 n.13 (Utah App. 
1990)(pre-Macruire case interpreting Gibbons to preclude use of 
affidavit in satisfying requirements of rule 11), and State v. 
Vasilicopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 95 (Utah App.)(affidavit stating that 
the defendant would be subject to consecutive sentences only 
under certain conditions inadequately reflected rule 11 
requirements), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
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he had been convicted (Arson PI. at 62). Although the trial 
court engaged defendant in a discussion of rights he was waiving 
by pleading guilty to murder, the court neglected to specifically 
mention that consecutive sentences could be imposed (R. 101 [9-
14]). However, the court scrupulously followed the procedure set 
out in Smith, incorporating the plea affidavit into the record by 
first ascertaining from defense counsel that (1) the affidavit 
had been prepared, (2) counsel had reviewed the affidavit with 
defendant, (3) counsel believed defendant understood the 
affidavit, (4) counsel had gone over the affidavit "word by 
word," and (5) counsel believed defendant understood his 
constitutional rights (R. 101 [4-5] ).17 Immediately thereafter, 
through colloquy with and positive affirmation from defendant, 
the trial court ascertained that (1) defendant was aware of plea 
affidavit his counsel had prepared and had enough time to go over 
it, (2) counsel had read the affidavit to defendant, 
(3) defendant had an opportunity to ask questions about anything 
he did not understand, (4) defendant was fully aware of the 
contents of the affidavit as a result of reviewing it with his 
counsel, (5) defendant was not under the influence of drugs, 
alcohol or anything that would impair his ability to think 
clearly, and (6) by signing the affidavit defendant understood he 
would be admitting that its contents were accurate and correct 
(R. 101 [5-7]). 
17
 The transcript of the relevant plea colloquy is attached 
at Addendum C. 
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When the court asked defendant if he had made a voluntary 
decision to sign the affidavit, defendant responded 
affirmatively, but then said, "I don't want to do this" (R. 101 
[8]). The trial court allowed defendant a recess in which to 
discuss his concerns with his counsel. Following the recess, the 
court again elicited from defendant positive responses 
establishing that defendant had an opportunity to speak with his 
counsel and have counsel answer his questions, and that defendant 
had signed the affidavit freely and voluntarily. Defense counsel 
also stated that he was convinced defendant was acting knowingly 
and voluntarily (R. 101 [8-9]). 
11
 [I] n cases where the judge does sufficiently question the 
defendant about his affidavit, the affidavit should be permitted 
to cover any gaps in the colloquy." Dastrup, 818 P.2d at 597 
(Russon, J., concurring). Because the court so thoroughly 
questioned defendant about his affidavit in this case, any 
omission in the colloquy does not negate that rule 11 
requirements were strictly complied with. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully 
requests that defendant's convictions be affirmed. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, 
the State does not request that it be set for oral argument or 
that a published opinion issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this // day of March, 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
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424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 






76-6-103. Aggravated arson. 
(1) Aperson is guilty of aggravated arson if iy means of fire or explosives he 
intentionally and unlawfully damages: 
(a) a habitable structure; or 
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a participant in the 
offense is in the structure or vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree. 
77-17-7. Conviction on testimony of accomplice — In-
struction to jury. 
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an accom-
plice. 
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the jury may be given to 
the efifect that such uncorroborated testimony should be viewed with caution, 
and such an instruction shall be given if the trial judge finds the testimony of 
the accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or improbable. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction) a defendant shall be repre-
sented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reason-
able time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by 
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the 
alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant re-
fuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall 
enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for 
an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defen-
dant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury 
trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has know-
ingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, 
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy 
public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-exam-
ine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the atten-
dance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are 
waived; 
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the mfafonmn sentence, 
that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any 
motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser in-
cluded offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be 
approved by the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to 
sentence is not binding on the court, 
(h) (1) The judge ahall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agree-
ment and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. 
The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense 
counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant 
and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defen-
dant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defen-
dant who prevails on appeal ahall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. I 77-16a-103. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996.) 
ADDENDUM B 
In The Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t c o u r t Of S a l t Lake county 
S t a t e o f Utah iOuLnuUi, 3,19% 
THE STATE OP UTAH/ 
P l a i n t i f f 
\ ^ c i A. &arvs> 
^ D e f e n d a n t 
STATEMENT OP DEPENDANT 
CERTIPICATE OP COUNSEL 
AND ORDER 
Crimina l No. ^bWOQ^OS P S 
COKES NOW, K'v<,if.( A.F\r>i£> .the Defendant in this 
case and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following: 

















0 0 0 C 5 9 
I have received a copy of the (charger (information) against 
me, I have read it, and I understand the nature and elements of 
the offense(s) for which I am pleading (guilty)(no contest). 
The elements of the crime (s) of which I am charged are as 
f o l l o w s : - ^ V s 6 A g - k / i r W ^ * . g t t / ^ U A c W OifC.L^^^fsCJS CaJ\&Lt\C\M 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am 
criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) 
charged are as follows: T .
 y KWi-A T W a . ^ . -CirtA <z\\A**> 
Q 4 Cjjg SOUTH M ^ « J O ^ « H ^ S, L, f .^  C« H /L« A, Cau^ijJ Uj^ 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with 
knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I recognize that a 
condition of my sentence may be to,, require me to pay an amount, 
as determined by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so 
appointed for me. 
2. I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I 
have waived my right to counsel, I have done so knowingly, 
000060 
intelligently and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this 
statement and understand the nature and elements of the charges 
my rights in this and other proceedings and the consequences of 
my plea of guilty. 
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney 
i s
 t/cMii^  X *^iw\Ay)A , and I have had an opportunity 
to discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences of my 
guilty plea with my attorney. 
5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have 
them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the 
right to compel my witness (s) by subpoena at State expense to 
testify in court in my behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf 
but if I choose not to do so I cannot be compelled to testify or 
give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be 
drawn against me if I do not testify. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me 
I need only plead ,fnot guilty'1 and the matter will be set for 
trial. At the trial rhe State of Utah will have the burden of 
proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If 
3 
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the trial is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous. 
9* I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I would 
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah 
Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court, and 
that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, 
those costs would be paid by the State. 
10. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for 
each offense to which I plead (guilty)(no contest). I know that 
» •"•• • 
by pleading (guilty) (no contest) to an offense to which I plead 
(guilty)(no contest). I know that by pleading (guilty)(no 
contest) to an offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence 
that I will be subjecting myself to serving a minimum mandatory 
sentence for that offense. I know that the sentence may be 
consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine or both. I know 
that in addition to a fine, a (twenty-five [25%])(eighty-five 
[85%]) surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 63-63a-4, will 
be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by the Court to 
make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes. 
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive 
periods, or the fine for additional amount, if my plea is to more 
than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, 
or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been 
convicted or to which I have pled guilty, my plea in the present 
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
4 
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12. I know and understand that by pleading (guilty) (no 
contest) I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights set 
out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by entering 
such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed 
the conduct alleged and I am guilty of the crime (s) for which my 
plea(s) is/are entered. 
13. My plea(s) of (guilty)(no contest) (isj(is not) the 
result of a plea bargain between myself and the prosecuting 
attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this plea 
bargain, if any# are fully contained in the Plea Agreement 
attached to this affidavit. 
14. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my 
plea(s) of (guilry) (no contest) , I must do so by filing a motion 
within thirty(30) days after entry of my plea. 
15. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a 
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either 
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on 
the Judge. I also know that any options they express to me as to 
what they believe the Court may do are also not binding on the 
Court. 
16. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind 
have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises 
except those contained herein and in the attached plea agreement, 
have been made to me. 
5 
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17. I have read this statement or I have had it read to me 
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know that I 
am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement. 
I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements 
are correct* 
18. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my 
attorney. 
19. I am XD years of age; I have attended school 
through the \% grade and I can read and understand the 
English language or an interpreter has been provided to me. I 
was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or 
intoxicants which would impair my judgement when the decision was 
made to enter the plea(s). I am not presently under the 
influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which impair my 
judgement. 
20. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, 
mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect or 
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently 
and voluntarily entering my plea. 
DATED this 3 day of bccL
 f 19^fr . 
DEFENDA-NT 
^Wa. | W * ^ t : S U v ^ r*<u>**>*A «L<*CUCTXL^ S V V W , ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OP ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for f\\g*^ \ (VP)zSfe,s, , 
the Defendant above, and that I now he/she has read the statement 
or that I have read it to him/her and I have discussed it with 
him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of 
its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the 
best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate 
investigation, the elements of the crime (s) and the factual 
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated 
and these, along with the other representations and declarations 
made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate 
and true. 
^'ATtORNEX/FOft DEFENDANT/BAR # 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in 
the case against M i &u*V A. P/ar*-i , Defendant. I have 
reviewed this statement of the Defendant and find that of the 
Defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense are 
true and correct. No improper inducements, threats or coercion 
to encourage a plea have been offered Defendant. The plea 
negotiations are fully contained in the statement and in the 
attached plea agreement or as supplemented on record before the 
7 
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Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence 
would support the conviction of Defendant for the offens.e(s) for 
which the plea(s) is/are entered and the acceptance of the 





Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and 
the certification of the defendant and counsel, the Court 
witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's plea(s) of 
(guilty) (no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is so 
ordered that the Defendant's plea(s) of (guilty) (no contest) to 
the charge(s) set forth in the statement be accepted and entered. 
DONE IN COURT this ^3 day of gjg <lSUYvdv4S\ _*^*3 h « 
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ADDENDUM C 
r ^ T r k i a COURT. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ~U] >9*£C9-UfiT| 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
- O 0 o -
STATE OF UTAH# 




Case No. 961900905 FS 
CHANGE OF PLEA 
(Videotape Proceedings) 
-o0o~ 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 3rd day of December, 
1996, commencing at the hour of 1:36 p.m., the above-
entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE 
SANDRA PEULER, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for 
the purpose of this cause, and that the following videotape 
proceedings were had. 
-o0o~ 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
RODWICKE YBARRA 
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
KEVIN J. KURUMADA 
Attorney at Law 
431 South 300 East, #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
FiLED 
OCT 2 2 1S97 
« « - - - . V ALAN P. SMITH, CSR ~ W "' 
38S BRAHMA OftlVE (801) 2*6-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH §4107 
990215-64 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We're on the record. 
The matter before the Court today is State of Utah 
vs. Miguel Flores. The case number is 961900905. I'll 
indicate for the record that Mr. Flores is present with 
counsel, Mr. Kurumada. The State is also represented by Mr. 
Ybarra. 
This matter is set for trial tomorrow and I'm 
advised that there's been an agreement reached and perhaps I 
could have counsel tell me what that is. 
MR. KURUMADA: That's correct, your 
Honor. 
MR. YBARRA: Yes, your Honor. The 
defendant now, of course, stands charged in this case with 
the offense of murder, a first-degree felony, with both gang 
and gun enhancements. He's also been previously convicted 
of the crime of aggravated arson before your Honor, first-
degree felony with gang enhance—well, I guess it does not 
have a gang enhancement. 
In addition, your Honor, there is an under—an 
outstanding investigation that indicates that Mr. Flores may 
be involved in a conspiracy or solicitation to commit 
murder* 



























the potential impact on the Board of Pardons with regard to 
consecutive and concurrent sentences on life sentences 
being, as we understand it, that doesn't have a whole lot of 
impact, inasmuch as the Board of Pardons has authority to 
keep the person in prison as long as they think appropriate 
on any one of those life sentences, under all of those 
circumstances, we have felt it appropriate to offer that if 
the defendant changes his plea to guilty as charged in this 
case, that is to the criminal homicide, murder, with both 
gang and gun enhancements, resulting in an enhanced minimum 
of nine years to life, with a consecutive one year for the 
gun enhancement, the State would move the Court at the time 
of sentencing, to sentence the defendant concurrently with 
the previously adjudged aggravated arson, and that we would 
agree not to file charges on the outstanding investigation 
of solicitation to commit murder, as long as no overt act 
occurred in that case, that in any way endangered the 
purported victim, Elizabeth Chacon. 
THE COURT: Let me just ask, Mr. Ybarra, 
have you consulted with the family members of the victim 
about this proposal? 
MR. YBARRA: I have, your Honor. 
They're present in the courtroom and I have spoken with them 
and explained to them what we were going to propose and I 


























their heads, your Honor. Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Is that correct? 
All right. And I assume then that you've carefully weighed 
any input or concerns that they expressed to you and that 
you fully explained your reasons to them for this proposal? 
MR. YBARRA: i have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I 
appreciate that. 
Mr. Kurumada, does that accurately set forth the 
plea agreement that you've reached in this case? 
MR. KURUMADA: It does, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Has the 
statement of defendant been prepared? 
MR. KURUMADA: It has. 
THE COURT: Have you had time to go over 
that with your client? 
MR. KURUMADA: Yes, I have. 
THE COURT: Do you believe at this time 
that he understands the contents of that agreement? 
MR. KURUMADA: I do. 
THE COURT: And have you had enough time 
to go over all of this with him so that you believe he 
understands the proceedings this afternoon? 
MR. KURUMADA: Yes. We've gone over it 


























THE COURT: And you also believe he 
understands his Constitutional rights? 
MR. KURUMADA: I do. 
THE COURT: All right. Let me ask the 
defendant some questions. 
Is your correct name Miguel Flores? 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you have a middle name, 
Mr. Flores? 
MR. FLORES: Yes. Angel. 
THE COURT: What is your middle name? 
MR. FLORES: Angel. 
THE COURT: And that's spelled 
A-n-g-e-1? 
You need to say yes or no, please. 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
What's your date of birth, sir? 
MR. FLORES: 8-18-76. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Flores, Mr. 
Kurumada tells me that you've had an opportunity to go over 
the statement that he's prepared, that's the document that's 
in front of you. Have you had enough time to go over that 
with him? 































that document or did Mr 
MR. 
THE 








Yes or no? 
Yes. 
All right. Did you read 







Which was it? Did you read 
He read it to me. 
All right. When he read it 
to you, did you also have an opportunity to ask him 
questions about it, if there was anything in there that you 
did not understand? 
MR. 
THE 




So, as you 
adequate amount of 
the document with him and to go over it so 
stand before me 
time 
that 






All right. Are 








































MR. FLORES: '95. 
THE COURT: Pardon? 
MR. FLORES: '95. 
THE COURT: All right. When's the last 
time you had a controlled substance, prescribed or 
otherwise? 
MR. FLORES: X don't have them. 
THE COURT: You've never had a 
prescriptive medication that you've taken? 
MR. FLORES: No. 
THE COURT: Is there anything that would 
impair your ability to think clearly today, Mr. Flores? 
MR. FLORES: No. 
THE COURT: All right. So, you're 
thinking clearly today; is that correct? 
MR. FLORES: Yeah. Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. You've told me 
that you understand the contents of the statement that 
you've gone over with Mr. Kurumada. Do you understand that 
if you sign that statement, that what you will be telling me 
by your signature is that everything in that document is 
accurate and correct. Do you understand that? 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 








































you may go J 
signing the statement and I'll : 
your Honor? 
off the record for 
need to go back-
record for a minute 
(Off the 
back on the record. 








Yes or no. Don't say yeah. 
Yes. 
Yes or no? 
Yes. 
All right. If that's your 
ahead and indicate that by 
receive it. 
I don't want to do this. 
KURUMADA: Huh? 
FLORES: I ain't going 





to do this. 
a minute, 
Yes. Would you like to go 





All right. We' 
I—I think we 
11 be off the 
Let me indicate that we're 
All parties and counsel are present as 
Mr. Flores has had an 
. 
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matters with Mr. Kurumada and I'll indicate for the record 
that Mr. Flores has executed the statement of defendant. 
Before I receive that, let me just ask, Mr. 
Flores, if you had an opportunity to speak further with Mr. 
Kurumada—• 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 
THE COURT: --and have him answer your 
questions? 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. And you've 
signed the statement of defendant freely and voluntarily; is 
that also correct? 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. And Mr. 
Kurumada, you're also convinced that Mr. Flores is going 
this knowingly and voluntarily? 
MR. FLORES: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Let me ask Mr. 
Kurumada, to state a factual basis for the plea. 
MR. KURUMADA: Yes. The—the elements 
of the crime with which he's charged are that the defendant, 
acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life engaged in conduct which created 
a grave risk of death to another and thereby caused the 


























His conduct, as outlined in this plea agreement— 
or excuse me, in this affidavit of guilty plea, is that: "I, 
Miguel Flores, fired shots in the hone occupied by Joseph 
Miera, thereby causing his death. These acts occurred on 
February 22nd, 1996, at 918 South Navajo Street, Salt Lake 
City, Salt Lake City/County, Utah." 
THE COURT: And Mr. Flores, is that an 
accurate statement of what you did? 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you some 
additional questions, Mr. Flores, about your Constitutional 
rights. If I say anything that you do not understand, will 
you let me know? 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. You understand, 
first of all, that you're not required to enter a guilty 
plea today or any other day. You have the right to proceed 
to trial and we have that trial set for tomorrow. Do you 
understand that right? 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 
THE COURT: You understand that if you 
proceed to trial, that you're presumed to be innocent and 
the only way that you can be convicted is if the State is 
able to prove each element of this offense beyond a 



























MR. FLORES: Yes. 
THE COURT: Specifically, in this case— 
Mr. Kurumada just went over the elements, but let me go over 
them with you, too, to make sure that you understand 
everything that the State would be required to prove. 
And that is as follows: At 918 South Navajo in 
Salt Lake County, on or about February 22nd, 1996, that you, 
as a party to the offense, intentionally or knowingly caused 
the death of Joey Miera and/or intending to cause serious 
bodily injury to another, committed an act clearly dangerous 
to human life, that caused the death of Joey Miera and/or 
that you, acting under circumstances evidencing depraved 
indifference to human life, engaged in conduct which created 
a grave risk of death to another and thereby caused the 
death of Joey Miera. 
Do you understand all of those elements that the 
State would be required to prove? 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you 
understand also that you'd have the right to have a jury 
trial, and again, the only way you could be convicted is if 
all of the jurors unanimously agreed that the State had met 
this burden of proof? 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 



























proceeded to trial, you'd have the right to see the 
witnesses, face-to-face, who would testify against you and 
you'd have the right to have your attorney cross-examine 
them on your behalf? 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 
THE COURT: You also understand that at 
the time of trial, you'd have the right to present evidence 
to the Court and to the jury also that would include your 
own right to testify, if you chose to do so but that would 
be a voluntary decision that you could make, no one could 
force you to testify and if you chose not to testify, no one 
could draw any negative conclusions from that silence. Do 
you understand that right as well? 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you also understand that 
if you were convicted following a jury trial, that you'd 
have the right to appeal that conviction to an appellate 
court? 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that by 
entering a guilty plea today, that you give up each of those 
rights that I've just asked you about? 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 
THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty to 



























MR. FLORES: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that this 
offense is charged as a first-degree felony that carries 
with it a term at the Utah State Prison of not less than 
five years, the term nay be up to life, and it also carries 
with it a maximum fine of up to $10,000; do you understand 
that? 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you also understand that 
by adding what's commonly called the gang enhancement and 
that is the enhancement for offenses committed by three or 
more persons, that that adds an enhanced sentence, which 
means in effect that the minimum term at the Utah State 
Prison, instead of five years would be nine years, which 
could be up to life? 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you also understand that 
with the firearm enhancement, that the statute requires the 
Court to sentence you to an additional, that is a 
consecutive one-year term, the Court may sentence you to an 
additional indeterminate term up to five years? 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you 
understand that the recommendations that have been made to 




























Do you understand that I've heard some 
recommendations from the prosecutor today relative to 
sentencing? Do you understand that those recommendations 
are not binding on me; in other words, I will listen to them 
carefully, I will consider them, but I'm not required to 
follow them? 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Has anybody 
promised you anything in return for this guilty plea? 
MR. FLORES: No. 
THE COURT: Has anybody threatened you 
or coerced you in any manner to get you to enter a guilty 
plea? 
MR. FLORES: No. 
THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the 
representation you've received from your attorney? 
MR. FLORES: Yeah—yes. 
THE COURT: Are there any other 
questions, Counsel, that either of you would have me pose to 
Mr. Flores before he enters his plea? 
MR. YBARRA: I have none. 
MR. KURUMADA: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll ask you to 
enter your plea at this time, Mr. Flores. 
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Hill you waive a formal reading, Mr. Kurumada? 
MR. KURUMADA: He would, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And I believe that the 
statement of defendant acknowledges the portion of the 
Information that talks about acting under circumstances 
evidencing depraved indifference; is that the portion that 
we're proceeding under today? 
MR. KURUMADA: That's correct. And that 
is in the statement. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Flores, I'll 
ask you to enter your plea then. The charge before the 
Court is criminal homicide, murder, a first-degree felony, 
at 918 South Navajo in Salt Lake County, on or about 
February 22nd, 1996, with the allegation that you, as a 
party to the offense, acting under circumstances evidencing 
depraved indifference to human life, engaged in conduct 
which created a grave risk of death to another, and thereby 
caused the death of Joey Miera. 
How do you plead to that charge, sir? 
MR. FLORES: Guilty. 
THE COURT: I do find, Mr. Flores, that 
your plea of guilty is knowingly and voluntarily made and 
will therefore receive it and enter it as a conviction at 
this time. I'll receive the statement of defendant that's 



























I also want to tell you about two additional 
rights that you have, Mr. Flores. The first right is the 
right to ask the Court to let you withdraw your guilty plea, 
if you have good cause to do that; but any motion to 
withdraw your guilty plea has to be filed within 30 days of 
today's date. Do you understand that? 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 
THE COURT: You also have the right to 
be sentenced during a particular tine period that begins 
three days from today and goes up to 45 days from today's 
date. 
I note that you're awaiting sentencing on an 
earlier charge. I spoke to counsel about having the pre-
sentence report prepared in connection with this offense 
also, so that A P & P could address both offenses at the 
same time. I suspect they'd be able to do it within the 45-
day time period, but to the extent that it takes them any 
longer to complete that, are you willing to waive the 
maximum time for sentencing? 
MR. FLORES: Yes. 
THE COURT: Are you willing to also 
waive the maximum time for sentencing on the aggravated 
arson charge, because obviously, if I sentence you on both 
of them at the same time, that one will have to be further 



























MR. FLORES: Yes. ! 
THE COURT: All right. 
Oivania, what date would we use, if we give then— 
THE CLERK: Well, we could do it January 
13th, that's probably two days short (inaudible) 
THE COURT: We can go with January 13th 
or we can go to the 27th. Oivania tells ne that the 13th is 
short of the 45 days, but I would guess that A P & P is 
already far enough along in preparing the other pre-sentence 
report that they've got the background information that we 
need, so I think we could probably do it on the 13th. 
MR. YBARRA: I would suggest as well, 
your Honor, that is a probability. 
MR. KURUMADA: That's fine. 
THE COURT: All right. He'll set this 
natter for sentencing then on January 13th at 1:30. That 
will be on the regular crininal calendar. 
Is there anything else that needs to be addressed 
today? 
MR. KURUMADA: No, your Honor. 
MR. YBARRA: I have no other natters. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. KURUMADA: Oh. 
THE COURT: I'll receive that. 



























stricken the trial date tomorrow. 
THE COURT: I will strike the trial 
date. Thank you for reminding me of that. 
We'll be in recess. 
MR. YBARRA: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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